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Abstract
Many people seem to share some version of what has been called the “intuition of neutrality” about creating new
people, which, roughly, says that there exists a certain range of levels of well-being such that creating people within
this range is, in itself, morally neutral, but creating people with a level of well-being outside this range is not morally
neutral. In this paper, I will discuss diﬀerent interpretations of this intuition, and speciﬁcally distinguish between what I
will call counterfactual interpretations and Do-interpretations of the intuition. I will argue that it is hard to interpret the
intuition in a way that does not give rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons favoring an empty future population,
when it comes to choices of social policy. In particular, this holds if we assume a conception of relevant outcomes of
actions reﬂecting consequentialist moral intuitions. In the end, I will formulate a normative principle of welfare
promotion which I argue respects the most plausible counterfactual version of the neutrality intuition.
Keywords: Intuition of neutrality, Population ethics, Necessitarianism, Antinatalism, Consequentialism
Basic aims, assumptions and notation
The aim in the ﬁrst part of the paper, up to section ‘A
Welfarist principle respecting a (NeuCf)-like intuition of
neutrality’, where the diﬀerent interpretations of the neu-
trality intuition are discussed, is mainly descriptive. In this
part, I will point to a potential conﬂict within one com-
mon sense conception of morality. In this context, a com-
mon sense conception of morality may be looked upon as
a set of moral norms that has gained widespread accep-
tance withinmodern societies. In determining the content
of common sense conceptions of morality, I will mostly
appeal to moral intuitions recognized as familiar from
modern philosophical literature. However, I do not claim
that the conception of morality that gives rise to the prob-
lem is shared by all, or most, people in the current world,
or even some current society. In section ‘The intuition’,
I make a taxonomy of diﬀerent versions of the neutrality
intuition, with diﬀering boundaries of the range of welfare
levels, such that bringing about people at these levels is
ethically neutral, with respect to the welfare of the poten-
tial people. In section ‘The counterfactual interpretations’,
I describe counterfactual interpretations of the neutral-
ity intuition, where the bringing about is interpreted in
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counterfactual terms: you bring about people by perform-
ing an action just in case the existence of those people
is counterfactually dependent of the performance of that
action. In section ‘The counterfactual interpretations and
antinatalism’, I discuss some antinatalist (i.e. giving moral
reasons against creating new people) implications of
these interpretations. In section ‘The do-interpretations’,
I describe a new class of Doing-interpretations, and
discuss their relation to the counterfactual interpreta-
tions, and I discuss potential antinatalist implications
of these interpretations. In that section, I also discuss
pro tanto implications of these interpretations for policy
choices.
I leave it open whether we should accept the antinatal-
ist pro tanto reasons yielded by diﬀerent versions of the
intuition, and I also leave it much open to what extent
they may be outweighed by other reasons, making it all
things considered permissible to create new people. In
section ‘A Welfarist principle respecting a (NeuCf)-like
intuition of neutrality’, I formulate a principle of wel-
fare promotion, which may be looked upon as a criterion
of rightness, if you are a Utilitarian, or (with an added
ceteris paribus clause) as a formulation of the proper sub-
set of morality concerned with promoting welfare, if you
are a deontologist, or a consequentialist who acknowl-
edges morally relevant ﬁnal values other than welfare.
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This principle is meant to appeal to those who ﬁnd the
(NeuCa)-version of the intuition appealing, and it has
the pro tanto antinatalist implications of this version of
the intuition. In an appendix, I give a more formal treat-
ment of the diﬀerent interpretations of the neutrality
intuition.
I assume that levels of well-being can be represented by
real numbers (and that there are thus no incommensura-
bilities of well-being). In the examples, I assume that there
are non-empty sets of possible individuals that would
exist, and that there are true answers to the question
what their level of well-being would be, given that cer-
tain actions are performed. In reality, it might not always
be true that a certain individual x would exist, or would
not exist, if a certain action were performed, or more
general, if a certain proposition p were true (it might be
that x merely might exist if p were true). However, var-
ious sorts of counterfactual indeterminacy would spell
trouble for most normative principles concerned with
actual outcomes (cf. (Carlson 1995) and (Horty 2001)),
and I make no attempt to solve these problems in this
paper.
The quantiﬁers ∀ and ∃ should be read as ranging over
all possible individuals. We also assume a existence predi-
cate, E, such that E(x) denotes a statement saying that the
possible individual x actually existsa.
Let propositions of the form lw(x) = a state that the
well-being of individual x equals a. Let p q denote con-
ditional statements, with a counterfactual operator, in the
style of David Lewis (Lewis 2001). Thus, p lw(x) =
a means that if p were the case, x’s level of well-being
would be a. I assume that the bearers of deontic sta-
tus are states of aﬀairs, and I will in this context focus
on statements of the form Do(x, p), in the style of Stig
Kanger (Kanger 2001[1972]), read that x sees to it that p
(and negated statements of this form, i.e. statements of the
form ¬Do(x, p)). I assume that reasons against seeing to it
that p for x are to be interpreted as reasons for ¬Do(x, p)
rather than Do(x,¬p). If we have moral reasons against
seeing to it that a certain state of aﬀairs is the case, we need
not have moral reasons for seeing to it that its negation is
the case.
The level of well-being for xmay be some aggregate sum
of some function of the hedonic levels, satisﬁed or dissat-
isﬁed preferences or achievements of some items on an
“objective list” during the diﬀerent parts of the life of x: I
will not discuss substantial axiological questions here. Nor
will I discuss identity criteria for individuals, even though
a full moral theory where the distinction between contin-
gent and necessary individuals plays a fundamental role
(which is the case with the principle I propose in section ‘A
Welfarist principle respecting a (NeuCf)-like intuition of
neutrality’) would have to answer these questions e.g. in
order to assess the moral status of abortions.
The intuition
In Weighing Lives, John Broome describes what he calls
an “intuition of neutrality” about the addition of people
to the world (Broome 2004, p. 143–145). He describes a
couple wondering whether to have a child, and ending up
with the decision to remain childless, because they think
their own lives will be better on balance without children.
Many people tend to think they are not acting wrongly,
and that there is not even a slight moral reason to have a
child, stemming from the child’s potential well-being, that
is outweighed by the couple’s beneﬁts from childlessness.
According to the intuition, there is some range of levels
of well-being such that bringing about people living their
lives at those levels is, in itself, morally neutral.
However, few people think that there never can be any
reasons for or against having children, related to the chil-
dren’s well-being. For example, many would claim that
there are strong moral reasons against having children if
these children would live their lives at a very low level of
well-being. Broome points out that there may, or may not,
be an upper limit, as a well as a lower limit, to this neutral
range. If there is an upper limit, we have moral reasons
to add people with a level of well-being above that limit,
for the sake of the well-being of these people. Let us dis-
tinguish between some types of neutrality intuitions that
diﬀer from each other as to how they specify the range of
neutral levels (where a and b are reals):
(Unbounded) The range is (−∞,∞). This type of neu-
trality intuition will not be discussed any further. I think it
has poor support in common sense, because it implies that
the fact that our potential children would live at the low-
est level of welfare possible cannot be counted as a moral
reason against having children.
(Upper bound only) A range of the type (−∞, b]. This
type will not be discussed any further, for the same reasons
as the former type.
(Lower bound only) A range of the type [ a,∞). Neutral-
ity with a lower, but no upper, bound. This type of neu-
trality can be regarded as equivalent with what has been
called The Asymmetry (Arrhenius 2000, p. 137)i.e. that we
havemoral reasons speaking against creating children that
would have poor lives, but nomoral reasons per se in favor
of creating children with good lives. This type of neutral-
ity intuition is the basis of the interpretations (NeuCf) and
(NeuCa), which I discuss in sections ‘The counterfactual
interpretations’ and ‘The do-interpretations’.
(Lower and upper bound) A range of the type [ a, b].
This type of neutrality intuition is the basis of the inter-
pretations (NeuCfUB) and (NeuCaUB), which I discuss
in sections ‘The counterfactual interpretations’ and ‘The
do-interpretations’. Note that, if we used a degenerate
interval, like [ a, a], we would essentially be denying the
intuition of neutrality.
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The intuition may, as in the recapitulation above, be
stated directly in deontic terms, i.e. in terms of moral rea-
sons or obligations, or it may be stated axiologically, i.e.
in terms of the value of outcomes, populations or other
value-bearers. Broome himself considers diﬀerent axio-
logical interpretations, because he is primarily interested
in questions about value, which he ultimately rejects, but
he considers the possibility of interpreting the intuition in
deontic terms (Broome 2004, p. 148).
The counterfactual interpretations
It might appear natural to interpret the limited intuition of
neutrality counterfactually, so that any individuals whose
existence is counterfactually dependent on the perfor-
mance of a certain action might give rise to moral reasons
for or against that action, in terms of their own potential
welfare, if their welfare would lie outside a certain neutral
range. Thus, we might consider a pair of counterfactual
interpretations of the intuition.
(NeuCf) states that if a certain individual xwould exist if
a proposition of the type Do(y, p)were true, but not if that
statement were not true, there is a moral reason against
Do(y, p), in terms of the welfare of x, if xwould live her life
below a certain lower bound of the neutral range a, but
there is no reason for Do(y, p), in terms of the welfare of
x, if x would live her life above a.
(NeuCfUB) is like (NeuCf) except for the assumption
that there is a closed, proper interval of neutral levels,
with both a lower and an upper bound, we can inter-
pret the intuition as follows. Thus, (NeuCfUB) adds to
(NeuCf) that there is a moral reason for Do(y, p) in terms
of the welfare of x, whose existence is counterfactually
dependent on Do(y, p), if x would live her life above the
upper bound of the neutral range. For a more formal treat-
ment of (NeuCf) and (NeuCfUB), see ‘The counterfactual
interpretations’.
As stated, (NeuCf) and (NeuCfUB) cannot, of course,
in themselves give any substantial normative guidance,
because we have not speciﬁed the a and b, i.e. lower
and upper bounds of the neutral range. For present pur-
poses, it is unnecessary to do so. The lower bound of
the neutral range, a, may, or may not, be identical with
a “zero level” of well-being, such that living is just as
good as not living for a person living at that level. If we
want to capture some intuition that is widely shared peo-
ple by living in the present world, we cannot place the
lower bound of the neutral range below the zero level, I
think.
The counterfactual interpretations and
antinatalism
Let EF denote the collective consisting of the couple Eve
and Frank, wondering about whether to have a child. Let
c stand for the statement that they conceive a child at a
certain time. Assume that if they were to see to it that c,
their child Doris, denoted d, would exist and live her life
at a level of well-being a+ within the neutral range [ a, b].
So, Do(EF , c) lw(d) > a ∧ Do(EF , c) lw(d) < b
is true, and there is thus no moral reason for Do(EF , c),
rather than its negation, or vice versa, in terms of the well-
being of the conceived child, Doris. However, there may
be, of course, reasons for conceiving or not conceiving, in
terms of other considerations, e.g. the positive and nega-
tive eﬀects of the existence of Doris on the welfare of other
people. I want to focus on a certain class of considerations.
It is probable that Doris, if she is brought into existence,
eventually will have children and grandchildren, and so
on.
Let CB denote the set of individuals “brought about”
by Eve’s and Frank’s conceiving, in the sense that they
would exist just in case Eve and Frank were to conceive
(see ‘Sets of individuals’ for exact deﬁnition). CB will
probably contain many individuals. Assume that some
individuals brought into existence, live their lives below a,
the lower bound of the neutral range, which is plausible, I
think, for any reasonable choice of a. Then, there is a risk
that ∃x[ Do(EF , c) lw(x) < a ∧ ¬Do(EF , c) ¬E(x)]
is true, i.e. some individuals whose existence would be
counterfactually dependent on Eve’s and Frank’s conceiv-
ing would live their lives below the lower bound a, and
there is thus a moral reason against Do(EF , c) according
to (NeuCf) and (NeuCfUB). If reasons of this type are
not outweighed by positive moral reasons for conceiving,
it seems that the intuition of neutrality, if we accept the
counterfactual interpretations, in practice tends towards
antinatalism, i.e. the view that conceiving children is gen-
erally morally wrong. In recent times, the antinatalist
view has been defended by e.g. David Benatar (Benatar
2006). Benatar’s main argument is that the existence
of bad things in the life of any individual implies that
the individual is harmed by being brought into exis-
tence, while the existence of good things does not imply
that the individual is beneﬁted by being brought into
existence.
Is it plausible to claim that these negative reasons are,
generally, outweighedb? If we assume (NeuCf), we can-
not, as the principle is deﬁned, say that the reasons against
Do(EF , c) derived from the negative well-being of people
in CB below the a-level are outweighed by positive rea-
sons derived from the well-being of people in CB living
above the a-level, because the existence of people living
good lives does not give rise to moral reasons in terms
of the well-being of those people, according to (NeuCf).
However, there might be other reasons for creating new
people, and I discuss that below. If we assume (NeuC-
fUB), we might claim that the well-being of people in
CB living above the upper bound, b, gives rise to rea-
sons for Do(EF , c), if b is not placed very high. However,
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I am inclined to consider (NeuCfUB) less plausible than
(NeuCf), as an interpretation of any widespread intuition
of neutrality. If the point of the neutrality intuition is that,
while you harm a person by creating if she would live an
unhappy life, you do not beneﬁt a person, in any morally
relevant sense, by creating her in the case where she would
live a happy life, this must also apply to cases where she
would live an extremely, as well as a moderately, happy
life. We can compare with Jan O¨sterberg, who writes that
“[m]orality . . . is concerned with the weal and woe of sen-
tinent beings . . . [a]nd you are not concerned with the weal
and woe of a person if you think it is better that he exists
and is happy than that he does not exist’, but “you are thus
concerned if you think it is better that he does not exist
than that he would have an unhappy life” (O¨sterberg 1996,
p. 97).
However, it also seems to be a common sense view
that we may have moral reasons (related to well-being)
to prefer one outcome to another even in some cases
where the ﬁrst outcome is not better for any individual
existing in both outcomes. I am thinking of cases like
the so-called Non-Identity Problems, described by Derek
Parﬁt in Reasons and Persons (Parﬁt 1984, p. 357–363).
In these cases, we have to choose between outcomes with
diﬀerent sets of existing people, and it seems plausible
that we have moral reasons to prefer the outcome W
to an outcome W ′, if the level of well-being in W (for
the individuals existing in W ) is higher than the level
of well-being in W ′ (for the individuals existing in W ′)c.
Could this help us in avoiding the anitnatalist tendency of
(NeuCf)?
Return to Eve and Frank, and their potential conceiving.
Let NCB denote the set of individuals that would exist
if Eve and Frank were not to conceive Doris, but not if
they were to conceive Doris. The intersection CB ∩ NCB
is always empty. It seems realistic to think that NCB is
non-empty. If Doris were never to exist, the person with
whom she eventually would have had children if she had
existed, might then ﬁnd another partner, and conceive
children with diﬀerent identities. It might be that NCB, if
Eve and Frank were not to conceive, would contain more
people than would CB, if they were to conceive, living
under the lower bound, a, of the neutral range, or that any
person in NCB would live at a lover level of well-being
than any person in CB. Then, we have diﬀerent types of
Non-Identity Cases, and it seems plausible to claim that
there are moral reasons for Eve and Frank to conceive.
But it seems that Eve and Frank cannot in any simple
way appeal to the neutrality intuition, in order to claim
that conceiving is something morally optional: they have
signiﬁcant moral reasons against conceiving, which may,
or may not, be outweighed by considerations about the
well-being of e.g. people that would exist if they were not
to conceive.
The do-interpretations
An alternative strategy would be to interpret intuition
of neutrality in terms of what is done, so that the well-
being of a possible individual might give rise to moral
reasons for or against performing an action consisting
in the bringing about of the existence of that individual,
as opposed to reasons stemming merely from the fact
that an individual would exist given that a certain action
was performed. The potential diﬀerences between these
interpretations are discussed below.
As the counterfactual interpretation, the doing-
interpretation might be speciﬁed without an upper
bound of the neutral range. Let (NeuCa) and (NeuCaUB)
denote the doing-interpretation without and with an
upper bound. With these interpretation, the counter-
factual dependencies in (NeuCf) and (NeuCfUB) are
replaced with references to the existence of individuals
and their welfare in the scope of the Do-operators. For
a more exact formulation of these principles, see ‘The
do-interpretations’.
Are the pairs (NeuCf)/(NeuCa) and (NeuCfUB)/
(NeuCaUB) equivalent in the sense that they, given the
same choice of a (and b, for the upper-bound variants),
yield moral reasons for and against the same states? They
need not be if we use a standard interpretation of the Do-
operator, like the one proposed by Stig Kanger (Kanger
2001[1972]). We only have to look at the so-called suﬃ-
cient condition aspect of agency to ensure that this is not
the case. Kanger uses the notation Do´(x, p) to express that
something x does is suﬃcient for p, which is implied by
Do(x, p). (Do´(x, p) is true at a world w just in case p is
true at every world w′ that stands in a certain relation to
w, Sds(w,w′). The intuitive interpretation of Sds(w,w′) is
that x performs the same actions in w′ as in w. Even if it
were the case that a certain proposition q, would be true at
the nearest possible Do(x, p)-world in relation to a world
w, f (w, p), so that the counterfactual Do(x, p) q is true
at w, Do(x, q) need not be true at that world (or any world
possible relative to w), because q might be false at some
world w′, such that Sds(f (w, p),w′).
Thus, in the example with Eve and Frank, it might be
true both that if they were to conceive Doris, some indi-
vidual, i would come into existence, and that i would not
come into existence otherwise, but Do(EF , c) might still
not imply Do(EF , E(i)). Is it also philosophically plausi-
ble to claim that we in many cases do not bring about
the existence of individuals who would not have existed
if we had acted otherwise than we did? In his monogra-
phy Consequentialism Reconsidered (Carlson 1995), Erik
Carlson discusses the problem of ﬁnding a notion of
action outcomes relevant for consequentialism. Accord-
ing to the simple notion WO, the relevant outcome of
an action is just the total state of aﬀairs that would be
actual if the action were performed, and according to the
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notion FO, the relevant outcome is the total future state
of the world from the beginning of the action (Carlson
1995, p. 10.) But Carlson also discusses diﬀerent inter-
pretations of the notion of the relevant outcome as the
“causal consequences” of actions (CO1–CO10), deﬁned
in terms of counterfactual dependence of outcomes on
actions. Some of the CO-notions are axiologically equiv-
alent to WO and FO, i.e. the consequentialist moralities
they would support, would contain the same set of obli-
gations. Carlson notes that these versions “allow state of
aﬀairs that we would not normally call ‘consequences’ or
‘eﬀects’ of a certain action, to be parts of the outcome of
this action’ (Carlson 1995, pp. 55). We would usually “not
call a state of aﬀairs s a ‘consequence’ . . . of agent P’s action
a if the causal path from a to s is too long and compli-
cated”, especially if this “path involves many other actions,
on the part of P or other agents” (Carlson 1995, p. 55).
Carlson claims that CO-notions not axiologically equiv-
alent to WO or FO should not be used in the formulation
of a consequentailist morality, because they fail to capture
“the fundamental idea of conequentialism”, that morality is
all about “making the world as good as possible” (Carlson
1995, p. 56). I am inclined to agree with this, but I also
think the observation that certain counterfactual depen-
dencies between an action and a state may disqualify the
state from being regarded a consequence of an action
should be taken seriously, if we want to analyze a notion
of “bringing about” inherent in an intuition belonging to
common sense morality.
Thus, it seems that if we interpret the intuition of neu-
trality along the lines of (NeuCa) or (NeuCaUB), we can
in a plausible way avoid the antinatalist tendencies of
(NeuCf) in typical cases where we consider an individual
couple’s decision about whether or not to have a child. It
might be that Eve and Frank, if they conceive Doris, only
bring about the existence of Doris, and not of the other
people in the set CB, because their existence would be
counterfactually dependent onmany other actions besides
the conceiving of Doris, and would thus not be a con-
sequence, in the relevant sense, of their conceiving. Of
these two interpretations, (NeuCa) might be more plausi-
ble than (NeuCaUB), for the reasons given for (NeuCf) in
favor of (NeuCfUB).
The neutrality intuition and policy choices
Derek Parﬁt discusses cases where the identity of future
people depends on choices at the political level, like his
famous Depletion case, where we have to choose between
diﬀerent policies with lesser or greater conservation of
resources, and we, in a couple of centuries will have a situ-
ation with no living person whose existence is not depen-
dent on the choice of policy (Parﬁt 1984, p. 360–363)d.
The counterfactual chains between the policy choice and
the identity of the future people will in many cases be
rather complex; the identities will depend on such things
as people’s choices about when, and with whom, they
will have children. Nevertheless, it seems that, according
to common sense morality, the existence of the diﬀerent
groups of people is included in the morally relevant con-
sequences of the diﬀerent policy choices. The notion of
morally relevant common sense-morality consequences
thus seems to be sensitive to the type of choice we are
considering, and this will have important consequences
for the implications of the neutrality intuition when we
consider choices of social policies. Consider the choice
between the following alternatives.
(Sterility) As a result of some kind of disease, D, human
fertility will decline, so that the number of new people will
decline, and humanity will cease to exist in a couple of
generations.
(Treatment) As a result of international co-operation,
scientists ﬁnd a cure for D, and humanity continues to
exist for many thousands of years, with an average level
of well-being well above the lower bound of the neutrality
range.
What could the moral reasons for or against the cure-
ﬁnding in (Treatment) be, as regards the implications of
(NeuCf) and (NeuCa)? Let I denote a collective of inter-
national decision-makers, researchers and so on, and t
denote the proposition that a treatment for D is found
and implemented. Consider ﬁrst Do(I, t) under (NeuCf).
We have the set TB, of large cardinality, containing the
people that will exist under t, and would not exist under
¬Do(I, t), where the scenario (Sterility) would be real-
ized. Most of the TB-people will live their lives with a
level of well-being above the neutral level, but some of
them will live below that level, and the existence of TB-
people below the neutral level gives us moral reasons for
¬Do(I, t) rather than Do(I, t), according to (NeuCf), as in
the case with Eve and Frank.
What about (NeuCa)? Consider a case with an institu-
tion giving fertility treatments, where it turns out that a
very large fraction of the children born as a result of their
parents using this treatment will live their lives with so
severe injuries that they fall under the neutral level, as
a result of some unforeseen side-eﬀect of the treatment,
which, however, could have been anticipated if more care-
ful testing had been done. According to common sense,
the institution could be held responsible for these eﬀects.
It is plausible, I think, to claim, that an agent x only can
be repsonsible for eﬀect brought about by x. If so, the
institution must be said to have brought about the exis-
tence of the unfortunate people. Why should not then I
be said to have brought about the existence of TB-people
living below the neutral level? If so, even (NeuCa) yields
moral reasons for ¬Do(I, t) rather than Do(I, t), which
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cannot be outweighed by moral reasons for Do(I, t), in
terms of the well-being of the TB-people living above the
neutral level. However, it seems unlikely that common
sense would give an antinatalist all-things-considered ver-
dict, preferring (Sterility) in this case. Then, if common
sense morality is not simply incoherent, there must be
other considerations inherent in common sense morality
that make it permissible to prefer (Treatment). Investigat-
ing into these reasons is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, it seems possible that there are e.g. some con-
siderations in common sense morality that permit giving
greater weight to the interests of present people, or peo-
ple living in the near future, and that these considerations
then may give rise to moral reasons outweighing the rea-
sons for ¬Do(I, t) rather than Do(I, t) given by (NeuCf)
or (NeuCa).
One alternative type of strategy, would consist in deny-
ing that common sense morality contains a neutral-
ity intuition in any of the senses discussed above, and
only claim that it contains something like an intuition
about what Gustaf Arrhenius has called Weak Asymme-
try. According toWeak Asymmetry, we indeedmight have
moral reasons for creating individuals with positive wel-
fare stemming from the welfare of these individuals, but
these moral reasons “can always be overridden by some
other consideration such as, for example, parental auton-
omy)” (Gustaf Arrhenius, Population ethics, fortchom-
ing). Thus, the reasons would not give rise to a moral
requirement to create new individuals against the wishes
of potential parents. If we accept this, some of the claims
stated in section ‘The intuition’, e.g. “that there is not even
a slight moral reason to have a child, stemming from the
child’s potential well-being”, obviously cannot be taken at
face value. A further assessment of this strategy is beyond
the scope of this essay.
AWelfarist principle respecting a (NeuCf)-like
intuition of neutrality
In this section, I postulate the normative principle
(NeuW), which I think is welfarist in spirit, aimed to take
care of a neutrality intuition without upper bound for the
neutral level, and with the lower bound set at the zero level
of welfare, i.e. the level such that life is not worth living
for an individual living below that level. For example, cre-
ating people with positive welfare “for their own sake” is
not required, according to the principle, and it is not per-
mitted to create people with positive welfare at the cost
of decreased welfare of people existing no matter what
we do (necessary people), and it is not permitted to cre-
ate people with negative welfare, if this can be avoided,
and is not outweighed by beneﬁts for existing people. The
relevant outcomes are whole worlds, which, as argued
in section ‘The do-interpretations’, I think is in accor-
dance with the intuitions behind consequentialist ethics.
However, I do not deﬁne the principle in terms of
any explicit value-ranking of outcomes. Such a ranking
would obviously have to be relativized to a particular
choice set, relative to which people may be necessary or
contingent.
In the following discussion, let us assume that we have a
non-empty set of worlds W that are accessible in a given
context of choice. Here, it is not necessary to deal with
multiple contexts (e.g. choice situations facing diﬀerent
agents, or the same agent at diﬀerent times), even though
a full elucidation of the deontic concepts would have to
do that. Let IN denote the set of necessary individuals, i.e.
the individuals existing in all worlds in W, IC(w) the set
of contingent individuals relative to a world w, i.e. the set
of all individuals existing in w but not in all worlds in W,
and tw(I) the total welfare of the individuals in set I. If I is
empty, let tw(I) = 0.
In accordance with what is stated in section ‘Basic aims,
assumptions and notation’, I do not intend the principle to
handle cases with indeterminacy as to whether some indi-
viduals would exist at certain levels of well-being, given
certain courses of action. Let us then assume that for any
proposition p (or more speciﬁcally, an action-proposition
of the type Do(x, q)) that is regarded as possible in the
context, a determinate world w ∈ W would be actual if p
were true.
(NeuW) Do(x, p) is permitted iﬀ there is a world w ∈ W
such that w satisﬁes the following conditions with respect
to any subsetW ′ ofW which includes w:
1. The total welfare of theW ′-necessary individuals (i.e.
the individuals existing in all worlds w′ ∈ W ′) in w is
at least as high as the welfare of these individuals in
any other world inW ′, and w contains no individuals
that areW ′-contingent (i.e. notW ′-necessary), OR
2. The total welfare of theW ′-necessary individuals in
w is at least as high as the welfare of these individuals
in any other world inW ′, and the total welfare of the
contingent individuals in w is also at least as high as
the welfare of the contingent individuals in any other
world inW ′ and allW ′-contingent individuals in w
have a total welfare above the zero level OR
3. if there is no world satisfying any of the above
conditions, w is included in a subsetW ′′ ofW ′,
consisting of all the worlds inW ′ where all
W ′-contingent individuals have a total welfare above
the zero level and the total welfare of all individuals
in w is at least as high as the total welfare of all
individuals in any other world inW ′′ OR
4. if there is no world satisfying any of the above
conditions, the total welfare of all individuals in w is
at least as high as the total welfare of all individuals
in any other world inW ′.
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This principle does not lead to normative dilemmas, i.e.
situations where no world is permissible, because it is easy
to see that for any non-empty set of worlds, at least one
world satisﬁes at least the fourth condition, provided that
there are no inﬁnite series of better and better worldse.
(NeuW) has the following implications in relation to the
main problem discussed in this paper, and some other
areas which have been central to the debate about popu-
lation ethics during the last decades (for a survey of this
debate, see (Arrhenius et al. 2010).):
1. It is always permitted to omit adding any contingent
people, if adding would confer no beneﬁt to the
necessarily existing people in a set of alternative
worlds.
2. It is not permitted to add contingent people, if the
only optimal state of aﬀairs as regards the welfare of
the necessary people, is a state with no contingent
people. In particular, we avoid some versions of
Parﬁt’s so-called Repugnant Conclusion (implied by
e.g. Classical Utilitarianism) (Parﬁt 1984, p. 387–391),
where a large population with each individual living
at a very low level of welfare is substituted for a small
population with each individual living at a very high
level of welfare. Assume that we have the set of worlds
W = {a |= tw(IN ) = 5 × 104, z |= tw(IN )
= 1 ∧ tw(IC(z)) = 106}
Here, a is the only permissible world, because it is the
only world satisfying condition 1 or 2 (see Figure 1).
Assume that we have the set of worlds
W ′ = {a0, a |= tw(IC(a)) = 5 × 104, z
|= tw(IC(z)) = 106}
where a0 is empty, IC(a) ⊂ IC(z), and IC(a) = 1 at z.
In this case, a0, and a are the only permissible worlds
Figure 1 The Repugnant Conclusion.
Figure 2 The Repugnant Conclusion with one possible empty
world.
(see Figure 2). There is an overlap of individuals
between a and z, but not between any other pair of
worlds, and with respect to the smaller set
W ′− = {a, z}, a is the only world satisfying condition
1 or 2 (remember that the individuals in a are
necessary relative to the setW ′−). However, assume
that we have the set of worlds
W ′′ = {a0, a |= tw(IC(a)) = 5 × 104, z
|= tw(IC(z)) = 106}
where a contains 1000 individuals living at level 50,
and z contains 106 individuals living at level 1, and
there is no overlap of individuals between a and z, a0
and z, but not a, are both permissible (see Figure 3).
This is because a0 trivially satisﬁes condition 1, and z
satisﬁes condition 2, but a satisﬁes neither condition
Because of this Utilitarian aggregation in such cases,
there are situations where (NeuW) violates Gustaf
Arrhenius’s so-called Normative Quality
Figure 3 The Repugnant Conclusion with non-overlapping
populations.
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Condition (Arrhenius 2000, p. 191f), and Weak
Quality Addition Condition (Arrhenius 2000, p.
194f), regardless of the choice of the relevant welfare
ranges. Are the implications discussed here
acceptable? Well, the aim of the consequentialist
principle here is to give a Utilitarian framework
taking care of the principle of the neutrality. One
interpretation of the Repugnant Conclusion, or the
two ﬁrst versions of it given above, is that its
repugnancy consists in its being an extreme case of
sacriﬁcing the interest of existing individuals for the
sake of purely hypothetical individuals. I am not here
interested in other potential reasons for its
repugnancy, e.g. reasons related to the Utilitarian
interpersonal aggregation of welfare per se. Also, if
e.g. all individuals in a live above the zero level, and
some individuals in z live below the zero level, a is
the only permissible world, according to condition 3.
3. The unacceptable implication of e.g. consequentialist
principles prescribing simply maximizing average
welfare in cases like Parﬁt’s Two Hells (Parﬁt 1984, p.
392), is avoided. Assume that we have the set of
worlds
W = {h |= tw(IN ) = −50, h+ |= tw(IN )
= −50 ∧ tw(IC(h+)) = −5}
In this case, h is the only permissible world, because
it satisﬁes condition 1, and h+ does not satisfy
condition 2, because the welfare of the added people
in h+ is below zero (see Figure 4). Assume that we
have the set of worlds
W ′ = {h |= tw(IN ) = −50, h++ |= tw(IN )
= −49 ∧ tw(IC(h++)) = −5}
Still, h is the only permissible world, because no
world satisﬁes any of the conditions 1–3, and h is the
only world satisfying condition 4, because it has the
highest total welfare (see Figure 5).
4. As regards Parﬁt’s so-called Mere Addition
Paradox (Parﬁt 1984, p. 418–419), we note the
following. Assume that we have the set of worlds
W = {a |= tw(IN ) = 50, a+ |= tw(IN ) = 50 ∧ tw(IC(a+))
= 25, b |= tw(IN ) = 45 ∧ tw(IC(b)) = 45}
In this case, it would only be permissible to realize a,
because it satisﬁes condition 1, and a+ does not
satisfy condition 2, because the contingent people
would be better oﬀ in b. However, if we had the set
W ′ = W − {b}, it would be permissible to realize any
of a and a+, because a satisﬁes condition 1, and a+
satisﬁes condition 2 (see Figure 6). Thus, an axiology
corresponding to (NeuW), in the sense that
impermissible alternatives are always ranked lower
than permissible alternatives, would violate the
so-called Mere Addition Principle given the set W,
but not given the setW ′ (Arrhenius 2000, p. 60).
5. As regards Non-Identity Problems like Parﬁt’s 14-
year old girl, where we can choose between creating a
person, which would live at a level of welfare which
would be low, but above the zero-point, one time and
creating another person, which would live at a higher
level of welfare, at another time (Parﬁt 1984, p.
357–363), assume we have the set of worlds
W = {n |= tw(IC(n)) = 1, n+ |= tw(IC(n+)) = 10}
In this scenario, n+ is the only permissible world,
because it satisﬁes condition 2, and no world satisﬁes
condition 1 (see Figure 7).
6. The principle has antinatalist implications of the
same type as (NeuCf) discussed in the main part of
Figure 4 Two Hells.
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Figure 5 Two Hells with a small beneﬁt to the necessary people.
this paper, because of conditions 2 and 3, which give
priority to worlds where no added person lives below
the zero level of welfare.
Concluding remarks
I have discussed how to interpret an intuition of neutrality
about future people with good lives, that may be inherent
in common sense morality. I have argued that the most
plausible interpretation of this intuition can avoid giv-
ing rise to antinatalist moral reasons, i.e. reasons against
Figure 6Mere Addition.
creating new people, in cases where we consider indi-
vidual choices about having children. However, in some
other situations, e.g. social policy choices aﬀecting the
identity of future people, such antinatalist implications
are not so easily avoided. In order to coherently avoid
supporting antinatalist policies, common sense morality
has to appeal to other, outweighing moral reasons. The
paper concludes with a principle of welfare promotion,
which is intended to respect the most plausible inter-
pretation of the counterfactual version of the neutrality
intuition.
Consent
Not applicable, as this paper does not refer any actual
patient cases.
Endnotes
aThe ∀-quantiﬁer (with ∃ deﬁned in terms of ∀ the
usual way in ﬁrst-order logic) and the existence pred-
icate could be given standard formal truth-conditions
for a ﬁxed-domain ∀-quantiﬁer, and a variable-domain
existence predicate, as in e.g. (Cresswell 2001, p. 147,
151).
bAs pointed out by one referee, things get more com-
plicated if we allow for incommensurability in welfare. I
ignore these complications here.
cAs noted by one referee, this goes against the so-called
Person-Aﬀecting Principle, according to which an out-
come o1 only can be better than another outcome o1 if o1
is better than o2 for some person, and Parﬁt thinks a belief
in this general principle, is part of common sense, so one
might ask how this line of reasoning ﬁts with the aim of
this part of the paper, i.e. explicating common sense intu-
itions. However, Parﬁt argue against the Person-Aﬀecting
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Figure 7 The Non-Identity Problem.
Principle by giving examples of particular cases, where
the principle gives, according to common sense, wrong
results.
dThe empirical reasoning, that the policy choice in a situ-
ation like Depletion would lead to disjoint populations in
a couple of centuries, might not be commonsensical, but
the moral opinion that we ought to conserve resources in
a case such described still seems to be part of common
sense.
eCf. (Lewis 2001, p. 97f ). This point was stressed by one
referee. However, this is realistic to assume in contexts of
human agency, I think.
Appendix
Formalization of the intuitions and principles
The counterfactual interpretations
(NeuCf) There is a number a, such that:
1. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
p is a state such that Do(y, p) and ¬Do(y, p) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense,
Do(y, p) lw(x) < a and ¬Do(y, p) ¬E(x), there
is a moral reason for ¬Do(y, p) rather than Do(y, p).
2. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
p is a state such that Do(y, p) and ¬Do(y, p) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense,
Do(y, p) lw(x) ≥ a and ¬Do(y, p) ¬E(x), there
is nomoral reason for Do(y, p) rather than¬Do(y, p),
or vice versa, in terms of the well-being of x.
(NeuCfUB) There is an interval [ a, b], with b > a,
such that:
1. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
p is a state such that Do(y, p) and ¬Do(y, p) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense,
Do(y, p) lw(x) < a and ¬Do(y, p) ¬E(x), there
is a moral reason for ¬Do(y, p) rather than Do(y, p).
2. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
p is a state such that Do(y, p) and ¬Do(y, p) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense,
Do(y, p) lw(x) ∈[ a, b] and ¬Do(y, p) ¬E(x),
there is no moral reason for Do(y, p) rather than
¬Do(y, p), or vice versa, in terms of the well-being of
x.
3. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
p is a state such that Do(y, p) and ¬Do(y, p) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense,
Do(y, p) lw(x) > b and ¬Do(y, p) ¬E(x), there
is a moral reason for Do(y, p) rather than ¬Do(y, p)
(and no moral reason for ¬Do(y, p) rather than
Do(y, p) in terms of the well-being of x).
Sets of individuals
Let EF denote the collective consisting of the couple Eve
and Frank, wondering about whether to have a child.
Let CB denote the set of individuals “brought about” by
Eve’s and Frank’s conceiving, CB = {x|Do(EF , c) E(x)∧
¬Do(EF , c) ¬E(x)}.
Let NCB = {x|Do(EF , c) ¬E(x) ∧ ¬Do(EF , c)
E(x)}.
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The do-interpretations
(NeuCa) There is a number a, such that:
1. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) < a) and Do(y,¬E(x)) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense, there is a moral
reason for Do(y,¬E(x)) rather than
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) < a).
2. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) ≥ a) and Do(y,¬E(x)) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense, there is no
moral reason for Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) ≥ a) rather than
Do(y,¬E(x)), or vice versa, in terms of the
well-being of x.
(NeuCaUB) There is an interval [ a, b], with b > a, such
that:
1. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) < a) and Do(y,¬E(x)) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense, there is a moral
reason for Do(y,¬E(x)) rather than
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) < a).
2. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) ∈[ a, b] ) and Do(y,¬E(x)) are
both possible, in a morally relevant sense, there is no
moral reason for Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) ∈[ a, b] ) rather
than Do(y,¬E(x)), or vice versa, in terms of the
well-being of x.
3. For any possible individual x, if y is an individual and
Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) > b) and Do(y,¬E(x)) are both
possible, in a morally relevant sense, there is a moral
reason for Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) > b) rather than
Do(y,¬E(x)) (and there is no moral reason for
Do(y,¬E(x)) rather than Do(y, E(x) ∧ lw(x) > b) in
terms of the well-being of x).
The principle (NeuW)
(NeuW) Assume that we have a set of worlds W, a set
of necessary individuals IN = {x|∀w ∈ W |=w E(x)}.
IC(w) yields the set of contingent individuals relative to a
world w, IC(w) = {x|x /∈ IN∧ |=w E(x)}. Let tw(I) denote
the total welfare of the individuals in set I. If I = ∅, let
tw(I) = 0. It is permissible to realize a worldw out ofW iﬀ
w satisﬁes the following disjunctive condition with respect
to anyW ′ ⊆ W such that w ∈ W ′:
1. The total welfare tw(IN ) of the necessary people in w
is at least as high as the tw(IN ) in any other w′ ∈ W ′,
and IC(w) = ∅, OR
2. tw(IN ) in w is at least as high as tw(IN ) in any other
w′ ∈ W ′, and tw(IC(w)) in w is at least as high as
tw(IC(w′)) in w′, for any other world w′ ∈ W ′, and
tw({x}) ≥ 0 for any individual x ∈ IC(w) OR
3. if there is no world satisfying any of the above
conditions, and if there is a non-empty set
W ′′ ⊂ W ′, such that
W ′′ = {w ∈ W |∀x ∈ IC(w)(w |= tw({x}) ≥ 0)},
w ∈ W ′′ and tw(IN ∪ IC(w)) in w is at least as high
as tw(IN ∪ IC(w′)) in w′, for any other world
w′ ∈ W ′′ OR
4. if there is no world satisfying any of the above
conditions, tw(IN ∪ IC(w)) in w is at least as high as
tw(IN ∪ IC(w′)) in w′, for any other world w′ ∈ W ′.
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